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COMMENTS
THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT OF 1978
A long overdue attempt to reform the United States' antiquated diplo-
matic immunity laws culminated in the recent enactment of the Diplo-
matic Relations Act of 1978.' The Act brings our nation's immunity laws
into accord with accepted international diplomatic practice and establishes
a mechanism to compensate American citizens for personal injury suffered
or property damaged in automobile accidents with diplomatic personnel.
In place of absolute immunity previously conferred upon all diplomatic
personnel regardless of rank or function,2 the new legislation adopts de-
grees of diplomatic immunity based on rank and duty, as provided in the
1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
The Act increases civilian protection by requiring insurance coverage
for all members of the diplomatic community operating motor vehicles.4
Additionally, it authorizes direct action against insurance carriers. Fur-
thermore, insurers are prohibited from raising diplomatic immunity as a
defense to avoid liability.' This revision of federal diplomatic immunity
law for the first time in two centuries permits judicial recourse by Ameri-
can citizens for acts committed by previously immune diplomatic person-
nel.
Prompted by the loss of diplomatic immunity by many embassy employ-
ees, the District of Columbia has restructured its traffic laws to bring these
individuals within its jurisdiction.6 Thus, the combination of federal and
local legislation significantly addresses the problems caused by moving
and parking violations as well as by automobile accidents. However, in
areas of citizen involvement with the diplomatic community such as con-
1. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 254a to 254e, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1364, 1351, 1251 (West Supp. 1979).
2. Ch. 9, §§ 25-27, 1 Stat. 117-18 (1790) (current version at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 254a to
254e, scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1979)).
3. Opened for signature April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3229 T.I.A.S. No. 7502, [1972] [Con-
vention provisions hereinafter cited as Articles]. See text accompanying notes 94-109 infra
for a discussion of the Convention.
4. Diplomatic Relations Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 254e (West Supp. 1979).
5. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1364 (West Supp. 1979).
6. District of Columbia Traffic Adjudication Act of 1978, D.C.L. No. 2-104 (1978),
[1978] D.C. Code Legis. & Admin. Serv. 212. See text accompanying notes 176-181 infra for
a discussion of the Act.
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tracts for personalty, the sale of real property and personal torts, the im-
pact of the Diplomatic Relations Act is still in doubt. The deference
historically accorded diplomatic immunity may serve to inhibit solutions
despite the creation of legal mechanisms designed to insure a just adjudi-
cation of these claims. Moreover, by creating new classifications entitled
to immunity, the new law substantially offsets the number of individuals
stripped of diplomatic privileges and immunities.7
Due to the large number of embassy personnel living and working
within the Washington metropolitan area, the Diplomatic Relations Act is
important to District of Columbia residents. This article will examine the
history and application of United States law to diplomatic practice and
evaluate the likely impact of this new legislation on several areas of local
concern.
I. HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITIES
4. Underlying Princples
The concept of diplomatic privileges and immunities stems from an an-
cient and substantially unaltered recognition of the need for unfettered
channels of communications between nations.8 Because the diplomat per-
sonifies his sovereign in a representative capacity and since the sovereign
cannot, by its very nature, be subject to another's jurisdiction, the sover-
eign historically has demanded complete inviolability for its agents.9 Two
major theories have influenced the evolution of diplomatic inviolability.
7. Over 7,000 family members of the administrative and technical staff who had no
immunity under judicial interpretation of the 1790 Statute are granted immunity from crim-
inal jurisdiction under the Diplomatic Relations Act. Conversely, approximately 4,000 indi-
viduals have, depending on their official status, lost varying degrees of both civil or criminal
immunity. Hearings on HR. 7819 Before Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations,95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 27 (1978) [hereinafer cited as Senate Hearings]. For a discussion of the classifications
contained in the Vienna Convention and adopted by the Diplomatic Relations Act, see text
accompanying notes 98-108 infra.
8. See IV G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 513-14 (1942).
Now, ambassadors. . . are necessary instruments for the maintenance of that gen-
eral society, of that mutual correspondence between nations. But their ministry
cannot effect the intended purpose, unless it be invested with all the prerogatives
which are capable of insuring its legitimate success, and of enabling the minister
freely and faithfully to discharge his duty in perfect security.
E. DEVATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 471 (4th ed. J. Chitty trans. 1835) (emphasis in the
original) [hereinafter cited as VATTEL]. See generally D. MICHAELS, INTERNATIONAL PRIVI-
LEGES AND IMMUNITIES 7-11 (1971).
9. The concept of inviolability implies immunity from "jurisdiction" in the law en-
forcement activities of the receiving state and imposes a special duty of protection for for-
eign diplomatic agents on the receiving state. E. DENZA, DIPLOMATIC LAW 149 (1976).
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The "extraterritoriality" theory states that property held for the benefit of
the sending state represents an extension of that sovereign's territory. Ac-
cording to the "representative character" theory, the diplomatic mission
personifies the sovereign, and therefore members of the mission are enti-
tled to diplomatic privileges and immunities. 0 To the extent that the dip-
lomat represents "his master in the first degree,"" any assertion of
jurisdiction by the receiving state over the person or property of the diplo-
mat is repugnant to the concept of sovereign independence of nations.
Powerful sanctions have customarily insured that diplomatic privilege
will be internationally protected. Fear of war or other reprisals deters the
breach of international law.1 2 Less severe sanctions, however, are usually
sufficient to protect diplomatic practice. States recognize that they func-
tion more effectively if the world community conducts itself according to
certain generally accepted standards of performance. Mutuality and reci-
procity" give rise to justified expectations in the preservation of diplo-
matic inviolability and reinforce the effect of "moral sanctions" when these
expectations are not satisfied. 4 Ultimately, the reciprocal and mutual rec-
ognition of diplomatic inviolability averts interference with sensitive diplo-
matic missions which could impede international communication.'
5
B. The 1790 Act
The concept of diplomatic inviolability was embedded in American law
in 1790 when Congress codified then existing diplomatic practice.' 6 The
10. II Y.B. INT'L COMM'N 94-95 (1958). Diplomatic inviolability derives from the obli-
gations imposed upon sovereigns to consent to "those things, without which it would be
impossible for nations to cultivate the society that nature has established among them, to
keep up a mutual correspondence, to treat of their affairs, or to adjust their differences."
VATTEL, supra note 8, at 471.
11. VATTEL, supra note 8, at 477-78.
12. In the ancient world, total war could be premised on lack of respect accorded a
sovereign's emissary. King David ordered an army to destroy the Ammonities after his
courtiers, sent to "comfort" King Hanun over his father's death, were subjected to indigni-
ties. Chronicles 19:1-19. See also C. RHYNE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1971).
13. Each nation is both a sending and a receiving state. To the extent that a state has
representatives abroad who may be held hostage subject to its treatment of a receiving diplo-
mat, it has substantial interest in reciprocity. DENZA, supra note 9, at 2. For a classic exam-
ple of the hostage technique of reprisal, popular in the sixteenth century, see VATTEL, supra
note 8, at 481.
14. See RHYNE, supra note 12, at 9.
15. For example, under the pretext of a civil action, "[t]he ambassador might be often
molested in his ministry, and the state involved in very disagreeable quarrels, for the trifling
concerns of some private individuals, who might, and ought to have taken better precautions
of their own sccurity [sic]." VAT-rEL, supra note 8, at 489.
16. Ch. 9, §§ 25-27, 1 Stat. 117-18 (1790) (current version at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 254a to
254e, scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1979)).
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1790 legislation was fundamentally a restatement of the Diplomatic Privi-
leges Act of 1708,17 a statute promulgated in Great Britain during the reign
of Queen Anne. An historical overview of this English statute aids in un-
derstanding the development of American law on diplomatic practice.
The English law was triggered in 1708 when the Russian Ambassador to
the Court of St. James, Matteuof, was forcibly dragged from his carriage
and detained for several hours by irate creditors.' 8 In response to the
Tsar's protests, Parliament declared all civil writs and processes against an
ambassador or his servant null and void and made any attempt to prose-
cute a civil action itself a criminal offense. By affording complete protec-
tion for the entire diplomatic entourage, including the private personal
servants of diplomatic agents, Parliament may have overreacted to the
Matteuof incident.' 9 Nonetheless, the Act did not address diplomatic im-
munity from criminal prosecution, 20 and failed to render diplomatic
agents liable in private actions related to the sale of real property and to
commercial activities. These exceptions to civil immunity were discussed
by early authorities and were already developing in other jurisdictions.2'
Despite these shortcomings, English and American courts repeatedly in-
voked the Statute of Anne as declaratory of the unalterable law of na-
22tions.
By 1790, the Statute of Anne was so enshrined as the law of nations that
Congress adopted it almost intact. 23 The United States law went further
17. 7 Anne c. XII (1708). See Trost v. Tompkins, 44 A.2d 226, 228 (D.C. 1945).
18. Case of Matteuof, 88 Eng. Rep. 598 (Q.B. 1710).
19. It appears that the Tsar was highly insulted by the incident since his ambassador
was not immediately released and the creditors were not put to death. When it became
apparent that the Tsar would not be mollified by the punishment of the creditors, Parlia-
ment enacted the legislation "as an apology and humiliation from the whole nation. It was
sent to the Czar, finely illuminated, by an ambassador extraordinary, who made excuses in a
solemn oration." Triquet and Others v. Bath, 97 Eng. Rep. 936, 937 (K.B. 1764).
20. At that time, criminal proceedings were under the control of the Crown rather than
Parliament.
21. Columbia, Egypt, India, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, and South Africa expressly
provided for civil jurisdiction over actions arising from lucrative activities which were in-
compatible with diplomatic functions. U.N. LAWS AND REGULATIONS pp. 65, 112, 167, 224,
243, 308, 330. DENZA, supra note 9, at 165. Furthermore, English law, outside of admiralty,
made no distinction between real and personal actions.
22. Taylor v. Best, 139 Eng. Rep. 201, 205, 487, 495 (Q.B. 1854); Magdalena Steam
Navigation Co. v. Martin, 121 Eng. Rep. 36, 44 (K.B. 1859). The Statute of Anne "was
declaratory simply of the law of nations, which Lord Mansfield observed. . . the act did not
intend to alter and could not alter." In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403, 420 (1890). The fact that the
Statute of Anne was primarily emergency legislation and not necessarily a comprehensive
restatement of diplomatic practice was not judicially recognized in America until Trost v.
Tomplins, 44 A.2d. 226, 228 (D.C. 1945).
23. The legislative history of the 1790 Diplomatic Immunity Law was not recorded be-
[Vol. 28:797
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than the Statute of Anne, however, by voiding all criminal as well as civil
writs issued against any diplomat or members of his official staff who had
been received by the President.24 Family members of the diplomatic staff
enjoyed the same immunities. Any attempt to serve a writ on an immune
individual was considered an offense against international law and sub-
jected the violator to a monetary fine and imprisonment for up to three
years.25
The 1790 law also differed from the Statute of Anne by distinguishing
between American and foreign servants in a diplomatic entourage. United
States citizens in diplomatic employment were not immune from suit for
debts contracted prior to entering service.26 Implicitly, process could be
served on a U.S. citizen after the termination of his diplomatic employ-
ment for acts committed during his immunized period of service.27 The
Act further restricted the immunity of domestic servants to only those
whose names had been registered in the State Department and were posted
in the District of Columbia Office of the United States Marshall.2 8 Once
their names were registered, members of the service staff and private ser-
cause the Senate convened behind closed doors until February 1794. J. BENTON, 1
ABRIDGEMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS 9, n* (1857).
24. Ch. 9, §§ 25-27, I Stat. 117-18 (1790) (current version at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 254a to 254e
(West Supp. 1979)).
25. Id On November 27, 1935, two policemen jumped on the running board of the car
of the Iranian Ambassador near Elkton, Maryland, and arrested the Minister and his chauf-
feur for speeding. The Minister was handcuffed for resisting arrest and the car and its occu-
pants were taken to the police station. Charges were dropped upon proof of the Minister's
identity. After diplomatic protest, the arresting officers were prosecuted, fined, and removed
from duty. The Governor of Maryland and the Secretary of State apologized to Iran and
expressed their regrets. The Minister was subsequently recalled. See Reeves, The Elkton
Incident, 30 AM. J. INTL. L. 95 (1936); and HACKWORTH, supra note 8, at 515. See also
Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (a United States Marshall could
not be compelled to serve a summons through mandamus on the Ambassador of Tunisia
since he would thereby subject himself to possible criminal sanctions under 22 U.S.C. §§
252, 253 (1976)).
26. Ch. 9, § 27, 1 Stat. 117-18 (1790) (current version at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 254a to 254e
(West Supp. 1979)).
27. Until 1978, a United States inhabitant entering into the service of a diplomatic mis-
sion and supplying his name to the Department of State enjoyed the same rights of extrater-
ritoriality as did other members of the mission. Upon leaving service, his extraterritorial
relationship was terminated and he was liable for all civil or criminal actions committed
during his service, subject to statutes of limitation. District of Columbia v. Paris, 33 AM. J.
INT'L. L. 787 (D.C. Police Ct. 1939) (former butler for the Japanese Embassy held liable for
ten traffic violations incurred during his employment).
28. Haley v. State, 200 Md. 72, 88 A.2d 312 (Md. Ct. App. 1952) (American citizen
serving as personal servant to Swedish attache could not assert immunity when criminally
charged for performing unnatural and perverted sexual practices since his name did not
appear on the White List and no official notification of his status was given to the State
Department). See generally 7 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST & INTERNATIONAL LAW, 110-15
1979]
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vants received the same immunities granted diplomatic personnel. Family
members of administrative and technical personnel, service staff, and pri-
vate servants enjoyed no immunity under the statute.
29
C Historical Bases for Granting Blanket Immunity
The congressional grant of total immunity in the 1790 statute is easily
justified when viewed in its historical context. Not only did English law
provide statutory precedent, but practical considerations warranted indul-
gent treatment of the diplomatic community. Diplomatic prestige and the
extravagant lifestyle of envoys from the sixteenth through eighteenth cen-
turies required heavy personal expenditures.3" Sending states made little
or no allowance for support. The diplomat was forced to incur debts or
engage in commercial activities in order to sustain the mission and main-
tain an appropriate standard of living.3 Consequently, no distinctions de-
veloped in British or American law between obligations undertaken on
behalf of the mission and debts contracted in a private or commercial ca-
pacity.32
In nations where process could be initiated through distraint of goods
and personal suit was unnecessary, creditors could obtain and execute
judgments against a diplomat's property if the act of seizure did not in-
fringe upon diplomatic inviolability.33 Since this procedure was unavaila-
ble in the United States under the 1790 law, wronged creditors had few
avenues of recourse. The diplomat's sovereign could be sued for property
(1970) (discussing the need for obtaining proper verification from State Department of Sta-
tus as a precondition for raising diplomatic immunity).
29. The accepted modem classification of members of the diplomatic mission is found
in the Vienna Convention, supra note 3, at Article 1.
30. DENZA, supra note 9, at 252.
31. Id See Magdalena Steam Navigation Co. v. Martin, 121 Eng. Rep. 36 (K.B. 1859).
The ambassador of Guatamala and New Granada was sued for contributions owed for un-
paid shares he held in a liquidating corporation. In a seminal decision dismissing the action,
Lord Campbell held that "a public minister duly accredited to the Queen by a foreign state
is privileged from all liability to be sued here in civil actions. ... Id at 44.
32. Taylor v. Best, 139 Eng. Rep. 201 (C.B. 1854). "If an ambassador violates the char-
acter in which he is accredited to our court by engaging in commercial transactions . . . he
does not thereby lose the general privilege which the law of nations has conferred upon
persons filling that high character ... ." Id at 241. As recently as 1977, diplomatic immu-
nity from civil jurisdiction was successfully invoked for the purpose of abrogating a fully
executed contract to sell Washington real estate owned by a diplomat for commercial invest-
ment purposes. Hearings and Markup on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities Before the
Subcomm. on Int'l Operations of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.
188-90 (1977) (letter of Rep. Joshua Eilberg to Office of Protocol) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings].
33. See DENZA, supra note 9, at 164.
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purchased as part of the envoy's official function.34 However, sovereign
immunity barred these actions in the absence of consent.35 If the debts
were contracted by the immune individual in his private capacity, a credi-
tor could theoretically attempt to sue in the foreign jurisdiction upon the
defendant's termination of service and return home. Until the recent en-
actment of the Diplomatic Relations Act, however, a creditor's only rea-
sonable recourse was to sustain the loss and demand surety or other legally
enforceable assurances in future commercial dealings with the immune in-
dividual.36
The 1790 Act also accorded blanket immunity from civil jurisdiction to
the entire diplomatic entourage for the commission of tortious acts. The
same principles underlying immunity from criminal jurisdiction justified
this freedom from liability for intentional torts.37 Viewed in the context of
the eighteenth century, the concept of total immunity from liability for
negligent conduct was not outrageous. Relatively small diplomatic staffs
served the diplomatic missions to foreign governments. Staff members
rode horses or drove carriages. In contrast to the horrific and frequent
damage caused by today's automobile, accidents occurring in horse-drawn
carriages caused relatively minor damages.38
The 1790 Act's grant of blanket immunity from criminal jurisdiction
was both a restatement and expansion of international law as developed
34. Magdalena Steam Navigation Co., 121 Eng. Rep. at 44; H. GROTIUS, II DE JURE
BELLI ET PARIS 217 (W. Whewell abridged trans. 1853).
35. See United States ex rel Cardashian v. Synder, 44 F.2d 895, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1930)
(petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the United States Marshall to serve process on
the Turkish ambassador quashed in an action to recover $20,000 for services rendered the
government of Turkey on grounds that Turkey did not consent to be sued). See also Hel-
lenic Lines Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Today, suit against foreign gov-
ernments for the tortious or commercial wrongs of a diplomatic agent acting within the
scope of his duties can be maintained under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1605 to 1611 (West Supp. 1979). See notes 110-16 and accompanying text
infra for a discussion of the Act.
36. The inconveniences creditors faced in their business relationships with members of
the diplomatic community were made abundantly clear in the Mattueof affair, see note 18
and accompanying text supra. Lord Campbell could only admonish the creditor to refuse to
supply an untrustworthy immune individual in the absence of a surety capable of being sued
on his behalf. Alternatively, the creditor could complain to the sending state. See Magda-
lena Steamship Navigation Co., 121 Eng. Rep. at 44. Refusal to supply goods or services to
diplomatic personnel as a class would, under United States law, subject the creditor to possi-
ble liability for discriminatory practices.
37. See text accompanying notes 39-44 infra.
38. Hearings on S, 477, S. 478, S. 1256, S. 1257 and H.R. 7819 Before the Subcomm. on
Citizens' and Shareholders' Rights and Remedies of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 20 (1978) (testimony of Senator Mathias) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hear-
ings].
1979]
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from the sixteenth century. The Mendoza affair resolved the question of
whether crimes against the receiving sovereign 39 were grounds to strip the
diplomat of immunity from criminal sanctions.40 In 1584, the English gov-
ernment accused the Spanish Ambassador, Don Bernardino de Mendoza,
of conspiring to depose Elizabeth I and to liberate Mary Queen of Scots.
4
1
Because of his ambassadorial status, the authorities never brought Men-
doza to trial. The concept thereafter evolved that the diplomat enjoys im-
munity from criminal process, subject only to a state's right to employ self-
defense against a diplomat's overt act of violence. n2 Such action by a state
is not in itself considered an exercise of criminal jurisdiction. Conse-
quently, the only reasonable method by which an accredited state can
show its displeasure is by inducing the sending state to recall its envoy or
declare the diplomat persona non grata and terminate official relations
with him.4 3
No legislative history exists explaining Congress' extension of broad
criminal immunity to the entire diplomatic entourage. While agency prin-
ciples exhibited in the civil immunity context were similarly applied to
grant diplomatic immunity from criminal jurisdiction, there was no legis-
lative precedent for immunizing the entire diplomatic mission. Immunity
from criminal jurisdiction, however, has been continually considered an
aspect of diplomatic inviolability." Although lower level diplomatic per-
sonnel have lost this protection, the immunity remains intact for the diplo-
matic and administrative and technical staffs in the Diplomatic Relations
Act of 1978.
39. The use of envoys in receiving states as agents provocateurs became notorious in the
sixteenth century. DENZA, supra note 9, at 149.
40. E. M. SATOW, I DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 390 (1917).
41. VATTEL, supra note 8, at 475.
42. GROTIUS, supra note 34, at 207-12. Grotius, writing in the sixteenth century, be-
lieved that "punishment may be had through his means who sent the ambassador; and if he
will not afford it, may be demanded by war of him as the approver of the crime." Id at 208.
The distinction between judicial measures for punishment and measures to protect the pub-
lic health and safety and prevent one possible injury to persons and property is discussed in
WHITEMAN, supra note 28, at 413 (letter of Assistant Legal Advisor for Diplomatic and
Consulting Affairs, Oct. 28, 1953). See text accompanying note 65, infra.
43. "Hence, if there be any delict which can be treated lightly, either it is to be over-
looked, or the ambassador ordered beyond the borders. ... GROTIUS, supra note 34, at
209. Persona non grata is a term employed in cases in which the envoy, having been accred-
ited in the receiving state as the diplomatic agent, has "given such offence to the Govern-
ment to which he was accredited, as to induce them to ask for his recall." SATOW, supra note
39, at 370. See Article 9 of the Vienna Convention restating this principle.
44. See text accompanying notes 99-102 infra. Article 31(I) of the Vienna Convention
is absolute in its prohibition of criminal jurisdiction over the diplomatic agent.
[Vol. 28:797
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D. Enforcement of the 1790 Act
In responding to the use of immunity as a defense to either civil or crim-
inal jurisdiction, courts recognized that sensitive issues of diplomatic prac-
tice were political and therefore vested in the Executive Branch.4 5 State
Department procedures resulting from the registration requirements of the
1790 Act reinforced this judicial deference.46 According to these regula-
tions, courts would automatically quash service of process on an accredited
diplomat whose name appeared on a State Department's "Blue List
' 4 7
once a motion for dismissal was made.48 Similarly, courts afforded defer-
ence to claims of immunity by lower level administrative and service per-
sonnel who were registered on the State Department's "White List."4 9 In
contrast to the immunities automatically attaching to Diplomatic Blue List
personnel upon their arrival in this country for service, registration on the
White List was and still is a precondition to the grant of immunity for
lower level embassy personnel.5" Theoretically, since only the sovereign or
his agent, the ambassador, could expressly waive diplomatic immunity for
all lower level personnel, refusal to waive immunity implied assertion of
the privilege as an affirmative defense.5 ' Separate waiver was, and still is,
45. See, e.g., Trost v. Tompkins, 44 A.2d 226 (D.C. 1945).
46. Ch. 9, §§25-27, 1 Stat. 117-18 (1790) (current version at 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 254a to 254e,
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1979)).
47. Individuals named on the Blue List are exempted from the requirement of notifying
the State Department of their official status. 22 C.F.R. § 4.2 (1978).
48. A typical illustration is the case of the son of a highranking Pakistani Embassy
official who was charged in two cases of automobile theft and petit larceny. Charges were
dropped when it was learned that he was immune from prosecution due to his familial
relationship. Groom, Judge Asks Action on Diplomatic Son, Wash. Star News, March 13,
1974 § A, at 3, col. 1, reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 134.
49. The White List was posted in the United States Marshal's office pursuant to section
252 of the 1790 statute. Embassies furnished names, addresses, and employment descrip-
tions at the State Department's request. If the served defendant's name appeared on this
List, the action was usually dismissed. United States v. Lafontaine, 26 Fed. Cas. 832
(C.C.D.C. 1931) (No. 15,550) (indictment against domestic servant of Swedish Charge
d'affaires for assault and battery quashed upon submission of letter informing court of ser-
vant's registration with State Department and his position as the diplomat's cook).
50. Haley v. State, 200 Md. 72, 88 A.2d 312, 316-17 (1952). Embassies must continue to
notify the State Department of the official status of mission members, family members, pri-
vate servants, and American citizens employed at the mission and entitled to privileges and
immunities pursuant to Article 10 of the 1961 Vienna Convention. See Article 10, supra
note 3, at 3234. Furthermore, a State Department regulation requires missions to report
deletions, additions, and alterations of diplomatic status on a "Notification of Status" form
within 30 days after the foreign official's arrival in the United States or after a change from a
nonofficial to an official status. 22 C.F.R. §§ 4.3-4.6 (1978).
51. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, Inc., 300 F. 891, 893-94
(S.D.N.Y. 1924).
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necessary for an execution of judgment.52 To prevent confusion over
whether immunity had to be asserted or whether silence implied an ab-
sence of waiver, a defendant sometimes presented a letter informing the
court of his employment at the embassy and his registration with the State
Department. 3 In the absence of such a letter or other compelling evi-
dence, the fact that a lower level embassy employee was not registered on
the White List,54 or was served after his name no longer appeared on the
List, 55 was presumptive of amenability to suit.
The United States Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdic-
tion over suits against diplomatically immune individuals.56 Since the
1790 statute made all service of process against such individuals void, it is
difficult to comprehend when jurisdiction could have been successfully in-
voked. Only one person has ever attempted to bring an original action in
the Supreme Court against a foreign ambassador,57 and no one has suc-
cessfully invoked the jurisdictional clause in its 180 years' existence.
Federal court jurisdiction against immune personnel could be invoked
in spite of these obstacles in certain circumstances. For example, the dip-
lomat could consent to be sued in the local jurisdiction. This method ne-
cessitated waiver of immunity by the sending country, however, since
52. See Article 32, supra note 3, at 3241; text accompanying notes 168-69, infra.
53. According to Whiteman, "there is no one procedure to be followed to establish to an
American Court's satisfaction that a person is entitled to diplomatic immunity under sec-
tions 252 to 254 of title 22 of the United States Code .... " WHITEMAN, supra note 29, at
116. It is sufficient that an ambassador has requested immunity for a lower level embassy
employee and that the State Department has recognized that the individual for whom im-
munity was requested is entitled to it, and that the Department's recognition has been com-
municated to the court. Carrera v. Carrera, 174 F.2d 496, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1949)
(Czechoslovakian ambasssador requested and was granted immunity for Ecuardorean na-
tional permanently residing in the United States who was registered as a domestic, in an
action brought by similarly employed wife for custody, maintenance, and support of their
child).
54. Haley v. State, 200 Md. 72, 88 A.2d 312 (1952). See note 28 supra.
55. District of Columbia v. Paris, 33 Am. J. Int'l L. 787 (D.C. Police Ct. 1939). But see
Shaffer v. Singh, 343 F. 2d 324 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In Shaffer, a member of the Indian Em-
bassy in Washington, D.C. was served with process in India under the District of Columbia
Non-Resident Motorist Act, D.C. Code § 40-423 (1973) after he left service and returned
home. While the D.C. Court agreed that he normally would have been subject to suit after
his name was removed from the State Department's White List, it nevertheless dismissed the
suit because he had immunity at the time of the accident and came within an exception to
the D.C. statute. Id at 326.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1976). See note 124 and accompanying text infra.
57. Founding Church of Scientology v. Lord Cramer, No. 51 (Oct. 1971),motion for
leave tofile bill of complaint denied, 404 U.S. 933 (1971). In Ex Parte Gruber, 269, U.S. 302
(1925), the only other reported case invoking the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
in suits affecting diplomats, the Court held that American diplomats accredited to foreign
governments were not covered by this judisdictional grant.
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immunity is theoretically held on behalf of the sovereign. 8 The immune
agent could also submit to jurisdiction by affirmatively bringing an action
himself.59 Furthermore, the institution of legal proceedings by a diplo-
matic agent traditionally has been regarded as an implied waiver of immu-
nity with respect to counterclaims arising from the same transaction.6 °
While waiver of immunity must be express, the institution of proceedings
by the diplomatic agent filing a counterclaim would seem to preclude the
invocation of immunity out of basic considerations of equity and fairness
to the original plaintiff.6' As recently as 1976, however, an Arlington, Vir-
ginia court dismissed a tort action against a secretary from the Brazilian
embassy despite the filing of a counterclaim by the named defendant.62
Once discovery disclosed the weakness of the defendant's case, she as-
serted diplomatic immunity and the case was dismissed.63
Suits involving real property other than that owned by or held for the
benefit of the sending country have, in America, been considered the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the state in which the property is located. 4 Thus, a
58. SATOW, supra note 40, at 252. Express waiver of diplomatic immunity from juris-
diction by the sending state is presently codified in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations. See Article 32(1) and (2), supra note 3, at 3241. Waiver of immunity from civil
or administrative proceedings does not imply waiver of immunity from execution of judg-
ment for which a separate and express waiver is necessary. Article 32(4), supra note 3, at
3241.
59. 28 U.S.C. §1251(b)(1) (1976).
60. SATOW, supra note 40, at 252. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
codified this exception in Article 32(3), supra note 3, at 3241, which provides: "The initia-
tion of proceedings by a diplomatic agent or by a person enjoying immunity from jurisdic-
tion under Article 37 shall preclude him from invoking immunity from jurisdiction in
respect to any counterclaim directly connected with the principle claim." Id
61. Harmon v. Yeager, 134 P.2d 695 (Utah 1943). "A counterclaim is viewed as an
original action, instituted by the defendant against the plaintiff and is tested by the same
tests and rules as a complaint." Id at 696. "The institution of legal proceedings by a diplo-
matic agent has long been regarded as a waiver of immunity with respect to a counterclaim
arising out of the same subject matter." WHITEMAN, supra note 27, at 433 (letter from
Assistant Legal Advisor for Diplomatic and Consular Affairs, Apr. 1964).
62. Lynn v. Mendes, No. 17712 (Arl. Cir. Ct., April 14, 1976), appeal dismissed, 217 Va.
cxii (1977). The plaintiff argued that the secretary's counterclaim constituted a waiver of
immunity since it amounted to the initiation of proceedings under Article 32(3) of the Vi-
enna Convention and customary international law. The trial court rejected the argument
and dismissed the case pursuant to the 1790 Statute. For a discussion of this case see text
accompanying notes 153-57, infra.
63. See Brief for Appellant at 4, Lynn v. Mendes, No. 17712 (Arl. Cir. Ct., April 14,
1976), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 118.
64. SATOW, supra note 40, at 252. "It is axiomatic that real property other than that
owned by the sending state and used for diplomatic purposes is within the exclusive jurisdic-
tion of the State in which it is located." WHITEMAN, supra note 27, at 407 (quoting Depart-
ment of State instructions to its delegation to the 1961 United Nations Conference in
Vienna).
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bank could bring foreclosure proceedings in local courts against property
owned by an immune individual despite the 1790 Statute. Property used
as a primary residence or connected with a mission function, however,
could escape execution of judgment through diplomatic inviolability.65
Process could not be served in a suit for deficiency judgment since the 1790
Statute made all personal service null and void.
A complete understanding of judicial deference in immunity cases re-
quires an appreciation of the difference between the use of immunities as a
defense to jurisdiction and the duty of diplomatic personnel to obey local
law. Under the theory of diplomatic immunity, an immune individual is
not freed from the restraints imposed by law or exempt from the duty to
observe them.66 He remains legally responsible for personally incurred
obligations. Diplomatic immunity insures, however, that the punitive
power of the state cannot be employed against the immune individual to
punish him for his failure to respect either the law or his own obligations.67
Diplomatic immunity has never been granted for the benefit of the indi-
vidual recipient, but rather to foster improved international relations.68
The 1790 Statute reflected a desire to avoid petty interferences with the
diplomatic mission which could trigger reciprocal sanctions by the sending
state, or upset sensitive diplomatic relations. In order to accommodate
these political interests, courts narrowly construed exceptions to the 1790
law and sometimes even granted immunity to individuals no longer legally
entitled to the privilege.6 9 In view of the severe historical and legislative
restrictions circumscribing judicial activity in the area of diplomatic prac-
tice, the judiciary was an inadequate forum for resolving diplomatic
problems.
E. State Department Policy Regarding Disputes with the Diplomatic
Community
The primary avenue of recourse under the 1790 Statute was not the
courts, but rather the Office of Protocol in the State Department. In ap-
65. Bryne v. Herron, I Daly 344, 78 Am. Dec. 698 (N.Y. County C.P. 1863) (action to
foreclose mechanic's lien on house owned by, but not private residence of, the Granada
Ambassador). "[Ilmmovable property possessed by a foreign Minister does not change its
nature in consequence of the character conferred on its owner, but continues subject to the
jurisdiction of the State in which it lies. . . . If, however, the Ambassador [or any member
of the mission] lives in a house of his own, that house is excepted from the rule." Id at 345.
66. IV J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST § 669 (1906).
67. Id.
68. House Hearings, supra note 32, at 62 (prepared statement of Chief of Protocol Evan
S. Dobelle).
69. Shaffer v. Singh, 343 F.2d 324 (10th Cir. 1965).
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propriate cases, Protocol notified the employing embassy and attempted to
promote a just settlement of the dispute.7' The office also would attempt
to persuade the embassy to waive the individual's immunity in civil
claims.7' In some cases, the Office of Protocol prevailed upon the parent
foreign government to make an ex gratia payment, that is, one based on
humanitarian grounds and implying no legal liability on the part of the
foreign government.72 If the offense charged was serious, threatening to
declare the offending individual a persona non grata was normally suffi-
cient to result in his withdrawal from service.7 3
By limiting the judiciary's role to primarily procedural jurisdictional is-
sues, the 1790 Act left substantive issues of liability to be resolved by the
executive department. A universal propensity to limit judicial activity in
the area of diplomatic practice continues to be reflected in current State
Department policy concerning American diplomatic personnel abroad.
Embassy employees are expected to obey local laws and are prohibited by
State Department regulations from invoking immunity to avoid payment
of just obligations. At the same time, Departmental immunity from civil
process is waived only if circumstances warrant the action and judicial
process in the receiving state can be expected to be fair. It is not general
Departmental policy to waive criminal immunity; if the offense for which
the individual is charged is grave enough, he will usually be withdrawn
from his foreign post by the government. 4
II. GROWING DISSATISFACTION WITH THE 1790 LAW
Many factors have influenced the growing disenchantment with the 1790
law over the past several decades. An increase in the size and number of
diplomatic missions based in Washington has occurred concommitant with
the United States' growing status in international affairs.7" The creation of
the United Nations, based in New York, resulted in a sizeable population
of diplomatically immune representatives and their families in that city.
76
70. House Hearings, supra note 32, at 212 (State Department responses to subcommittee
questions concerning Department policies).
71. Id The waiver is expressly limited to civil claims.
72. Id
73. A survey of United States government declarations of persona non grata can be
found in SATOW, supra note 40, at § 418. The declaration has been employed almost exclu-
sively in political contexts. Incidents include a Salvador envoy who published remarks dis-
paraging President McKinley in order to influence an election, and a British minister who
was unjustifiably dismissed as a result of sabotage by a Republican Party prankster.
74. House Hearings, supra note 32, at 213.
75. Approximately 18,809 individuals comprise the Washington diplomatic community.
H.R. REP. No. 1410, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978).
76. Since the United Nations established its headquarters in New York in 1946, the
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Moreover, since 1945, both cities have welcomed many diplomatic mis-
sions representing newly independent third world nations, some of which
lack experience in diplomatic practice. Increasing contact between the
diplomatic corps and their American communities has often resulted in
friction.77
Reflecting a trend of less deference towards diplomatic immunity, sev-
eral judicial opinions from the post World War II period attempted to
narrow the scope of the 1790 statute. In Agostini v. DeAntueno,78 a New
York state court assumed jurisdiction in a proceeding to recover the leased
premises of a diplomatic envoy. Characterizing the suit as a proceeding in
rem, the court ruled that real property held by a diplomatic officer in a
receiving state and not pertaining to his diplomatic status was properly
subject to local laws. Had the court interpreted the suit as a breach of
contract, the diplomat would have remained immune from process. De-
spite the court's characterization of the action, the decision suggests that
had the apartment been his primary residence and therefore related to his
status, the property would have remained inviolable and immune from
execution under an in rem judgment.79
An attempt to limit the scope of immunity by close judicial scrutiny of
White List personnel was made in Trost v. Tomkins. ° The District of
Columbia Municipal Court ruled that registration on the List and the State
Department's duty to publish names of embassy employees were purely
ministerial functions intended to give notice to unsuspecting individuals
who might inadvertantly incur criminal liability for unintentional viola-
tions of the Act.8 Consequently, the White List alone did not serve as
sufficient evidence of diplomatic status. In the absence of executive action,
a defendant's claim to diplomatic immunity was deemed a proper subject
population of diplomatically immune individuals in that city has increased to almost 5,000
people representing approximately 150 nations. Id
77. The New York City Parking Violation Bureau estimates that approximately 250,000
unpaid tickets totalling about $5 million of lost revenue per year are issued to the diplomatic
community in New York. House Hearings, supra note 32, at 49 (prepared statement of Rep.
Stephen Solarz).
78. 199 Misc. 191, 99 N.Y.S. 2d 245 (1950).
79. The question of whether a leased apartment is a principal residence pertaining to
diplomatic status is primarily a question of fact. Under present United States law, Article
31(3) of the Vienna Convention clearly protects a diplomatic agent's residence from meas-
ures of execution. Article 31(3), supra note 3, at 3241. While a local court today may obtain
jurisdiction over an in rem action since it is the only forum in which the suit can be brought,
judgment could not be executed due to the inviolability of the premises until the tenant
terminated his employment with the mission.
80. 44 A.2d 226 (D.C. 1945).
81. Id at 229.
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of judicial inquiry. While recognizing the Executive Department's prerog-
atives in diplomatic practice, 2 the court found that the registration mecha-
nism did not amount to executive action or certification of diplomatic
immunity for White List personnel. Although the defendant was regis-
tered on the List and used embassy offices, the court found that he was not
engaged in traditional diplomatic functions deserving of immunity.
A. Community Discontent with the 1790 Statute
The problems under the 1790 law drawing the greatest attention in-
volved traffic accidents, parking and traffic violations, realty disputes, and
nonpayment of bills.83 Since the majority of contacts between the diplo-
matic and domestic communities occurred in the District of Columbia
metropolitan area,84 this community naturally was predominant among
those seeking revision of the law on diplomatic relations. Traffic accidents
caused by members of the diplomatic community in which extensive per-
sonal injury or property damage occurred were of particular concern, since
often the victims were left without compensation or remedy. 5
In one such accident in April 1974, the Panamanian Cultural Attache
negligently ran a red light and collided with the car in which Dr. Halla
Brown, Professor of Medicine and Chief of the Allergy Clinic at George
82. Executive action with respect to diplomatic status is based on reciprocal agreements
or customs between nations. For example, the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 permits the
President, on the basis of reciprocity, to extend more or less favorable treatment than is
provided in the Vienna Convention. 22 U.S.C.A. § 254c (West Supp.1979). See also Article
47, supra note 3, at 3248-49; Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 27-30.
83. At the time of the State Department's testimony before the House Subcommittee, 55
claims or complaints made by United States citizens or businesses, against foreign diplo-
matic personnel between 1974 and 1977 were unresolved. This list of claims, which does not
include parking complaints, appears in House Hearings, supra note 32, at 214.
84. The estimated population of the diplomatic community in the Washington commu-
nity as of 1978 is:
Diplomats accredited to the United States 2,309
Family Members (estimated) 5,772
Members of the technical and administrative staff 2,877
Family Members (estimated) 7,192
Members of the service staff 273
Domestic servants 606
Diplomats of missions to the Organization of
American States 233
Family Members (estimated) 582
Total 19,844
See Senate Hearings, supra note 7, at 27.
85. While the State Department sought repeal of the 1790 law in every Congress since
1965, Congress failed to act because of House inaction. S. REP. No. 95-958, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1935 [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT].
19791
Catholic University Law Review
Washington University, was riding. 6 Dr. Brown was rendered a
quadraplegic and incurred expenses totalling over $200,000 for treatment.
The Panamanian Embassy and Government refused to make any indem-
nification until October 1977 when it settled the dispute with an ex gratia
payment of $100,000.87
Traffic and parking violations exacerbated the friction between the dip-
lomatic and local communities. The absence of adequate parking facilities
in embassy occupied districts resulted in clogged streets and double park-
ing. The threat of parking or moving violation fines failed to deter the
diplomatic community since these violations were entirely within the city's
criminal jurisdiction and the diplomatic corps was fully aware of its immu-
nity from prosecution. In 1976 alone, 52,830 parking tickets were issued to
automobiles bearing diplomatic tags of which only 20 per cent were paid.
Nearly a million dollars of city revenue was lost.
88
Aside from inadequate parking facilities and the absence of meaningful
deterrence for diplomatically immune scofflaws, lax enforcement of city
laws reflected State Department fears that strict enforcement of local traffic
laws would trigger reprisals by foreign governments.89 While State De-
partment policy requires United States Foreign Service personnel and
their families stationed abroad to satisfy obligations arising from traffic
violations, the general policy of most foreign capitals is to either not issue
tickets or cancel them because of immunity.90
Civic groups, such as the Kalorama Citizens Association and the Citi-
zens' Committee on Diplomatic Immunity, were increasingly vocal advo-
cates for reform of the domestic law and city practices.9 ' Citizen outrage
was grounded partially in the recognition that reciprocity between nations
no longer justified the blanket protections afforded by the 1790 law. As of
July 1977, 122 nations were parties to the 1961 Vienna Convention on
86. See House Hearings, supra note 32, at 80-81.
87. Dr. Brown also claimed damages for loss of income and for pain and suffering. Id
at 81. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
88. House Hearings, supra note 32, at 42. These figures do not take into account the
thousands of ticketable violations which were ignored or the revenue which was wasted in
writing the tickets (prepared statement of District of Columbia Representative Walter Faun-
troy). For a breakdown of outstanding tickets by embassy, see id. at 194.
89. Bowman, Many Embassy Aides to Lose Parking Immunity, Wash. Post, Jan. 13,
1979, § C, at 1, col. 3.
90. In Rome, diplomats are exempt from fines. Diplomats stationed in Paris are given
"lenient treatment." Soviet authorities do not normally cite diplomats for traffic violations,
and unpaid tickets in London are cancelled because of immunity. Senate Hearings, supra
note 7, at 55-56 (prepared State Department statement).
91. See House Hearings, supra note 32, at 191 (statement of Kalorama Citizen's Associ-
ation); id at 192-97 (statement of Citizens' Committee on Diplomatic Immunity).
[Vol. 28:797
Diplomatic Relations Act
Diplomatic Relations which substantially limited the scope of diplomatic
immunity. In light of that fact, incidents posing increased dangers to
United States Foreign Service personnel abroad 92 and the growing abuse
of diplomatic immunity in this country, have enhanced the incongruity of
a double standard.
93
B. The Vienna Convention
As public tolerance of diplomatic abuses dwindled, international sup-
port developed for a reexamination, in light of post World War II condi-
tions, of the body of diplomatic practice and law which had developed
since the eighteenth century. In 1952, the United Nations General Assem-
bly requested the International Law Commission to prepare draft articles
on diplomatic intercourse and immunities.94 In 1959, the General Assem-
bly convened the Vienna Convention to formulate a comprehensive body
of uniform rules governing diplomatic functions and relations. These rules
govern the rights, privileges, and obligations of the diplomatic entourage,
the mission itself, and the state in which territory diplomatic functions are
performed. 95 The United States was among the forty-five nations origi-
nally signing the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations96 in 196 L"
In stark contrast to the blanket immunities afforded the diplomatic com-
munity under the 1790 American Statute, the Vienna Convention adopted
a functional approach towards diplomatic privileges and immunities.98 In
its most highly visible and relevant change, the Vienna Convention di-
vided members of the diplomatic missions into four categories: diplomatic
92. One heavily publicized incident was the discovery, in 1978, of Soviet microwave
bombardment of the American Embassy in Moscow and the resulting fear of increased can-
cer risks to the personnel working and living in the mission.
93. House Hearings, supra note 32, at 196 (statement of Citizens' Committee on Diplo-
matic Immunity).
94. 1958 U.N.Y.B. 386.
95. House Hearings, supra note 32, at 96.
96. [1972] 23 U.S.T. 3229, T.I.A.S. 7502, 1961 U.N.Y.B. 517-18. The United States was
initially a reluctant participant in the codification of diplomatic practice. It argued that the
subject was sufficiently governed by custom and usage and that regulation by convention
would "introduce an unnecessary element of rigidity." 1958 U.N.Y.B. 386.
97. As of July 1977, 63 nations had signed the Vienna Convention, 59 had signed and
ratified it, four states had signed but not ratified, and 63 nations had acceded or succeeded to
the Articles. One hundred twenty-two out of 147 eligible nations were parties to the Con-
vention as of 1977. House Hearings, supra note 33, at 200.
98. The concept that different categories of embassy personnel should enjoy varying
degrees of immunity was by no means established when the Conference first met in 1958.
The Special Rapporteur of the Conference initially gave identical privileges and immunities
to all members of the mission since they had all been traditionally considered essential to the
embassy suite. See U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/91 Art. 24.
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staff, administrative and technical staff, service staff, and private ser-
vants.99 Under Article 31 of the Convention, ambassadors, high ranking
members of the mission in the first category, and their families, retain ab-
solute immunity from criminal jurisdiction. They possess absolute civil
immunity subject to three exceptions: civil suits regarding privately owned
real estate,'°° personal actions relating to succession and other estate mat-
ters,1°1 and personal actions relating to professional or commercial activi-
ties carried on in the receiving state outside the scope of their official
functions.0 2 Members of the diplomatic staff qualifying as nationals or as
permanent residents in the receiving state receive only official functions
immunity unless the state extends additional privileges and immunities.
0 3
All lower level embassy staff who are receiving state nationals or perma-
nent residents enjoy only those privileges and immunities a receiving state
chooses to extend.1' 4
The second category, comprising administrative and technical staff and
their families, is granted absolute immunity from criminal jurisdiction.
Immunity from civil and administrative jurisdiction is available for this
group only with respect to acts performed in the course of official duties.
Family members are fully subject to civil and administrative jurisdic-
tion.' 05
No immunity is available for service staff members in the third category
99. Article i. Historically, there had never been distinctions between these categories
inasmuch as they were all deemed to be essential to the embassy "suite." Since all personnel
were afforded the same degree of immunity, the distinctions were not of legal importance.
Sending states employed whatever criteria they pleased in classifying their personnel.
DENZA, supra note 9, at 12.
100. Article 31(l)(a), supra note 3, at 3240-41. If the private immovable property owned
by the diplomatic agent is not held on behalf of the mission or is not his primary residence,
the defense of inviolability could not be raised to defeat execution. See note 78 supra.
101. Article 31(l)(b), supra note 3, at 3240.
102. Article 31(l)(c), supra note 3, at 3241. The International Law Commission's Com-
mentary on the 1958 draft of Article 29 stated, "activities of these kinds are normally wholly
inconsistent with the position of the diplomatic agent and . . . one possible consequence of
his engaging in them might be that he would be declared a persona non grata." 2 Y.B. Int'l
L. Comm'n 98 (1958). Since such cases inevitably occurred, however, the Commission be-
lieved that "persons with whom the diplomatic agent had commercial or professional rela-
tions cannot be deprived their ordinary remedies." Id.
103. Article 38(1), supra note 3, at 3245.
104. Article 38(2), supra note 3, at 3245.
105. Articles l(f), 37(2), supra note 3, at 3231, 3244. Under the 1790 Act, family mem-
bers of the administrative and technical staff were not allowed immunity from criminal or
civil jurisdiction. This category is the only one, because of the Convention's grant of crimi-
nal immunity, which enjoys broader protections today than it did under the 1790 Act. For a
chart succinctly comparing the provisions of the Vienna Convention with those of the 1790
Act, see SENATE REPORT, supra note 85, at 2, 1936.
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who are nationals or permanent residents of the receiving state. Foreign
service staff members enjoy immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction
only in respect to acts performed within the course of their duties.' 6 Pri-
vate servants in the fourth category who are not nationals of the receiving
state are exempt from domestic employment taxes as are individuals in the
other three categories. They do not enjoy immunity from civil or criminal
jurisdiction unless expressly provided for by the receiving state.'0 7
With its sliding scale of immunity entitlement, the Vienna Convention
preserves traditional notions of extraterritorial sovereignty of the diplo-
matic staff while recognizing the need for some degree of legal accounta-
bility over lower level embassy employees and nationals serving on
mission staffs.' By explicitly prohibiting diplomatic agents from engag-
ing in professional or commercial activity and permitting maintenance of
personal suit for obligations arising from these activities, the Convention
also resolved a major issue which had been a subject of continual abuse in
England and the United States.'0 9
The Vienna Convention's provisions became effective in the United
States in 1972, but because Congress failed to repeal the antiquated 1790
law until 1978, the diplomatic community in the United States continued
to enjoy far greater protection than that provided by international law.
C. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
Although the 1790 law continued to protect the diplomatic staff from
personal suit until passage of the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Con-
gress opened a potential avenue of recourse through enactment of the For-
eign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976." l° The Act codified the
"restrictive" principle of sovereign immunity by limiting the immunity of a
foreign government to suits involving that state's public acts (lure imperil).
Under the Act, a foreign government is not immune from suits based on its
commerical or private acts (jure questionis). "' The Act transferred the re-
106. Articles 1(g), 37(3), supra note 3, at 3244.
107. Articles 1(h), 37(4), supra note 3, at 3244.
108. The commentary written by the International Law Commission characterized the
different levels of immunity as "the 'functional necessity' theory, which justifies privileges
and immunities as being necessary to enable the mission to perform its functions." 2 Y.B.
Int'l L. Comm'n 95 (1958).
109. See notes 31-32 and accompanying text supra.
110. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602 to 1611 (1976).
111. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprintedin [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs 6604, 6605 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]. The Act permits recovery for
obligations arising out of commercial activities carried on in the United States by a foreign
government or its instrumentality. See United Euram v. U.S.S.R., 461 F. Supp. 609
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Soviet Union is liable for breach of contracts signed pursuant to cultural
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sponsibility for sovereign immunity determinations from the executive to
the judicial branch, thus relieving the State Department of the foreign pol-
icy implications of immunity determinations." 2 Moreover, the Act pro-
vided a statutory basis for obtaining in personam jurisdiction over the
foreign state without necessitating attachment of a government's property.
In contrast to past immunity from execution, the Act assured judgment
creditors some remedy if, after a reasonable period, the foreign state or its
enterprise failed to satisfy a final judgment.' 13
As one of several exceptions to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign
state, the law established suits for monetary damages when tortious acts or
omissions of its officials or employees are alleged." 4 The statute allowed
recovery when the defense of sovereign immunity, as distinguished from
diplomatic immunity, had legally barred recovery in the past. The torts
alleged must have been committed by representatives while performing
their official duties. The foreign state remained immune from actions aris-
ing from the discretionary functions of its employees." 5 Finally, the law
permitted execution against any insurance policies held by a foreign gov-
ernment covering accidents caused by its agents in the performance of
their duties. There was no requirement, however, that insurance be ob-
tained. "
6
III. THE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ACT OF 1978
In order to update our diplomatic laws and fill the interstices created by
the 1976 law on sovereign immunity, Congress enacted the Diplomatic Re-
lations Act of 1978.' '7 The law repeals the 1790 Statute and substitutes the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations as United States law on dip-
lomatic practice." 8 Section 2 of the new law defines the categories of dip-
lomatic personnel and family members who are entitled to privileges and
exchange agreement under which State Concert Society of the U.S.S.R. agreed to provide
performing artists for U.S. concert tours).
112. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 111, at 6606.
113. Id.
114. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976).
115. Id at § 1605(a)(5)(A).
116. See House Hearings, supra note 32, at 14 (statement of Senator Mathias). Appar-
ently, an injured party may seek recovery under either the Diplomatic Relations Act or the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act when the act alleged occurred in the course of the diplo-
matic employee's official duties. Id
117. 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 254a to 254e, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1364, 1351, 1251 (West Supp. 1979)
[hereinafter referred to as 1978 Act].
118. 22 U.S.C.A. § 254b (West Supp. 1979).
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immunities, incorporating definitions from the Vienna Convention." 9
Section 2(3) of the Act expands the Convention concept of mission to in-
clude missions representing foreign governments collectively. In past
United States practice, such collective missions have been extended the
same privileges and immunities as missions representing individual gov-
ernments.120 As a result, the United Nations, the Organization of Ameri-
can States, the Commission of European Communities, and their staffs
continue to enjoy diplomatic status under the new law.' 21 Section 4 of the
Act grants the President the discretion to extend more or less favorable
treatment to missions, mission members, families and diplomatic countries
on a reciprocal basis.' 22 This provision permits the President to restrict
Vienna Convention privileges and immunities in those hardship cases
where certain nations restrict the privileges of Foreign Service personnel
abroad. While it serves as an important tool in implementing foreign pol-
icy, such discretion must be employed on a reciprocal basis with the na-
tions involved. Section 5 provides for dismissal of judicial or
administrative actions brought against individuals entitled to immunity.
Application for dismissal may be made by or on behalf of the individual
by a "motion or suggestion. . . or as otherwise permitted by law or appli-
cable rules or procedures."' 123 Section 8 of the new law vests federal dis-
trict courts with original jurisdiction over all civil actions and proceedings
against diplomatic personnel.' 24  Section 1251(a)(2) of Title 28, which
119. Id at § 254a; Articles I and 37, supra note 3, at 3230-31, 3244. For an enumeration
of the categories used in the Vienna Convention, see text accompanying note 99 supra.
120. 22 U.S.C.A. § 254a (West Supp. 1979).
121. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 85, at 4.
122. 22 U.S.C.A. § 254c (West Supp. 1979). This provision reflects Article 47 of the
Convention allowing such practices. Article 47, supra note 3, at 3248-49.
123. 22 U.S.C.A. § 254e (West Supp. 1979).
124. Id at § 8, amending 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1976). Section 1251(b)(l) of title 28 was
amended to conform with section 1351 by vesting original jurisdiction in the federal district
courts. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1251(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979). Section 1351 vested federal district
courts with original jurisdiction only over actions and proceedings against consuls and vice
consuls of foreign states until its amendment in the Diplomatic Relations Act. The 1978
amendment also rectifies an inadvertant prohibition on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction
by state courts over foreign consuls which occurred during the 1949 revision of the Judiciary
Code. Prior to 1949, federal district courts had exclusive jurisdiction over all "civil actions"
against foreign consuls. In 1949 the words "all actions and proceedings" were substituted in
place of the previous "civil action" language. This modification had the unfortunate effect
of granting foreign consular officers defacto immunity from state criminal law jurisdiction
in the situations where they would be subject to liability under existing international treaties
such as the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, T.I.A.S. 6820, 21 U.S.T. 77, Article
41. Consequently, until the 1978 revision, consular officers were fortuitously immune from
criminal actions solely cognizable under state law. See note 164 infra.
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vested exclusive jurisdiction of such actions in the United States Supreme
Court, was repealed.
A. Mandatory Liability Insurance
The Diplomatic Relations Act comprehensively addressed the problem
of automobile accidents caused by members of the diplomatic community.
Section 6 authorized the President, by regulation, to establish liability in-
surance requirements to be met by missions, mission members, and their
families for risks arising from the operation of motor vehicles, vessels, or
aircraft.'25 The amount of coverage to be required has been determined
by final regulations promulgated by the State Department.
26
Compulsory liability insurance laws are well established in international
diplomatic practice. As of February 1978, 89 countries had mandatory
liability insurance measures. Of 27 nations which did not, seven required
diplomatic personnel to insure their vehicles before approval of registra-
tion or issuance of license plates.' 27 The State Department requires all
foreign service personnel with personally owned vehicles at foreign posts
to carry liability insurance whether or not required by local law.
In spite of the prevalence of these programs internationally, similar con-
gressional proposals were met with open hostility by the insurance
lobby.'28 Among the lobby's objections to mandatory insurance was its
belief that the diplomatic community was a poor insurance risk and that
the diplomatic immunity issue was essentially a social and political prob-
lem rather than an insurance one. The insurance lobby supported propos-
als providing for government compensation to injured parties through a
general tax fund to be administered by a bureau of claims in the Depart-
125. 22 U.S.C.A. § 254e (West Supp. 1979).
126. 44 FED. REG. 29,450-52 (1979) (to be codified in 22 C.F.R. § 151.5). The State
Department recommends minimum liability limits of $100,000 per person, $300,000 per inci-
dent for bodily injury, including death, and $50,000 per incident for property damage. Id at
29451 (to be codified in 22 C.F.R. § 151.5). While these are only suggested minimum limits,
the insurance must "provide not less than the minimum limits of liability specified in the
financial responsibility, compulsory insurance or other law in the jurisdiction where the mo-
tor vehicle is principally garaged." Id (to be codified in 22 C.F.R. § 151.4).
127. Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 103-118 (State Department analysis of mandatory
liability coverage in 116 nations). The amount of coverage required varies widely from
$11.5 million per accident in Sweden to nominal sums in many Latin American and African
nations. Id at 103. All cars registered by diplomats, permanent missions to the United
Nations, and top U.N. officials are subject to local compulsory insurance laws. House Hear-
ings, supra note 32, at 218.
128. See, e.g., Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 47-50 (prepared statement of Stacy L.
Williams, Assistant Vice President and Associate Legislative Counsel, Government Employ-
ees Insurance Company, accompanied by John Nangle, Washington Counsel, National As-
sociation of Independent Insurers).
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ment of State. An alternative proposal would have deemed the United
States liable in cases where courts could not levy judgment due to the dip-
lomat's immunity from suit. 29 Statistics offered by independent insurance
agents indicating that diplomats were a profitable risk compared to other
segments of the population undercut these proposals.'3 °
Insurance companies generally have opposed compulsory insurance and
other legislative tools which shift the primary purpose of insurance from
protecting the tortfeasor to compensating the injured victim for the negli-
gence of financially irresponsible motorists. 31 Despite industry hostility,
however, compulsory insurance has gained increasing legislative and judi-
cial favor.
To compel insurers to protect the insured in the event that the driver at
fault is uninsured or his coverage is not effective because of breaches in
policy terms, many states have enacted unsatisfied judgment funds or
mandatory uninsured motorist coverage statutes. These laws have filled
gaps in state insurance law's omnibus clauses 32 and financial responsibil-
ity laws 133 caused by valid assertions of policy defenses by the insurer
against the insured. The District of Columbia is notorious for being one of
the few jurisdictions without some form of uninsured motorist coverage. 
134
The existence of state uninsured motorist coverage, however, has been
insufficient to counteract diplomatic immunity defenses raised by insurers
to defeat liability. While many state legislatures and courts have, in the
public interest, drastically curtailed state-created immunities,'35 federal
129. Id. at 47. S. 477, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) would have made the Government
liable for damages levied by a court against an immune member of the diplomatic commu-
nity. S. 478, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) provided for a Bureau of Claims presided over by
an Assistant Secretary of State.
130. The total average loss ratio for diplomats during a four-year period ending in 1977
was 12.5%. Permissible loss ratios by insurance companies for automobile coverage is 50-
55%. Loss ratio is the ratio of the premiums collected to the claims paid out. Id at 54
(statement of Fred Bruney, Executive Vice President, Pennamco Insurance Service, Inc.).
131. Id at 60 (prepared statement of Howard B. Clark, Former Special Assistant Fed-
eral Insurance Administration). See generally 7 D. BLASHFIELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 272 (1966).
132. These provisions require that all coverage afforded the insured extend to any person
who uses the automobile with his permission. BLASHFIELD, supra note 131, at § 315.1-.16.
For an example of this provision, see 7 VA. CODE § 46.1-504(b) (1978 Supp.).
133. Security deposit financial responsibility laws provide that any automobile owner or
driver involved in an accident must post security in an amount sufficient to cover any possi-
ble judgment if he fails to furnish adequate insurance or risk losing his registration and
license.
134. Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 61.
135. Examples include statutory or judicial curtailment of sovereign, charitable institu-
tion, interspousal, and interfamilial immunities from liability.
1979]
Catholic University Law Review
preemption precludes state restrictions on the use of diplomatic immunity
as a defense in personal actions. Uninsured motorist statutes entitle the
victim to collect only those amounts which, but for defenses or lack of
insurance, he would be legally entitled to recover from the other party. '
36
Since a state could not enforce legal obligations arising from an accident
against a diplomatically immune individual, the victim's own insurer was
under no legal duty to make its client whole.
137
While the compulsory insurance mechanism created in the Diplomatic
Relations Act will help insure that injured or damaged victims obtain
some compensation, practical problems remain. Although the State De-
partment has suggested that the diplomatic corps insure itself in amounts
much higher than those presently required in local jurisdictions, 38 there is
no such legal requirement. Department regulations establishing minimal
policy coverage limits may reflect an institutional bias in favor of the dip-
lomatic community. The regulations require those subject to the Act to
purchase only the minimal insurance coverage specified in the financial
responsibility, compulsory insurance, or other law in the jurisdiction in
which the automobile is principally garaged.
39
The District of Columbia's financial responsibility law requires the post-
ing of sufficient security to satisfy any judgment for damages resulting
from automobile accidents, or,"4 in the alternative, motor vehicular insur-
ance in minimum amounts of $10,000 per bodily injury or death, $20,000
per accident, and $5,000 for property damage. 14 ' Suspension of driving
privileges is the sanction for failure to post security.' 42 Under the State
Department regulations, members of the diplomatic community who ga-
rage their automobiles principally in the District would be required to
purchase these minimal amounts. Arguments that the diplomatic corps
should not be discriminated against by regulations requiring certain cover-
136. Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 61-62.
137. Lynn v. Mendes, No. 18621 (Arlington Cir. Ct. Oct. 27, 1976) (insurer's motion for
dismissal granted in action brought by the insured under Virginia's uninsured motorist stat-
ute due to prior dismissal of a suit brought by insured against a diplomatically immune
tortfeasor). See text accompanying notes 154-57 infra.
138. In Virginia, automobile owners must insure themselves in minimum amounts of
$25,000 per person for bodily injury including death, $50,000 per accident involving two or
more persons, and $10,000 for property damage. 7 VA. CODE § 46.1-504 (1978 Supp.). In
Maryland, insurance must be obtained or security posted in minimum amounts of $20,000,
$40,000, and $5,000 for the above categories. MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 17-103 (1977).
139. See note 126 supra for proposed State Department regulations.
140. D.C. CODE §§ 40-432, 433 (1973).
141. Id at § 40-435. Security required after an accident is reported cannot be in excess
of the insurance limits specified. Id at § 40-436.
142. Id at § 40-437.
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age limits regardless of the jurisdictions in which cars are located appear
unpersuasive. In contrast to the normal situation in which the tortfeasor
may be held personally liable despite the absence of insurance or may be
sued for amounts over and above policy limits if he is insured, insurance
proceeds may be the only compensation a party will receive if injured or
damaged by a diplomatically immune individual. The decision to treat
District residents and the diplomatic community alike can only be consid-
ered nondiscriminatory in those situations in which the diplomatically im-
mune tortfeasor is so destitute as to be considered judgment proof, since
the victim would be foreclosed from further recovery despite the
tortfeasor's privileged status. While regulations providing only minimal
compensation for grievously injured parties seriously undermine the reme-
dial policies of the Act, the regulations are a vast improvement over the
1790 Statute.
143
Other implementation problems flaw the Act. Despite the minimal cov-
erage requirements, insurance companies may hesitate to insure immune
mission members.4 To protect themselves from perceived vulnerability,
they may set unrealistically high rates or place insured diplomatic person-
nel in assigned risk pools. Insurers could also impose preconditions, such
as requiring previous domestic driving experience, which would effectively
bar those most likely to cause injury from coverage. Insurer reluctance to
fully insure the diplomatic corps at reasonable rates, however, is unjusti-
fied. The community subjected to the Act's compulsory insurance cover-
age is relatively small when compared with the number of individuals
protected under state compulsory insurance laws. Background, education,
and professional responsibilities and restraints distinguish the diplomatic
corps from the average cross-section of the larger domestic community.
Once insurers have had experience in writing policies under the provision,
insurer hostility or discrimination will undoubtedly dissipate.
45
B. Direct Action Against Insurers
United States common law requires the plaintiff in a negligence action
to assert his or her claim directly against the negligent tortfeasor and does
not afford the opportunity to directly reach the proceeds under an insur-
143. Enactment of a national no-fault insurance plan could of course directly address the
problem of judgment proof tortfeasors.
144. Interview with Mr. Horace F. Shamwell, Jr., Office of Protocol, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 8, 1979).
145. Telephone conversation with Mr. David Stewart, Office of Protocol, Department of
State, Washington, D.C. (March 27, 1979).
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ance contract between the tortfeasor and a third party.'46 Compulsory in-
surance is in itself inadequate to guarantee the injured victim
compensation since the defense of diplomatic immunity could still be
raised to defeat jurisdiction.
In order to make the mandatory insurance coverage provision meaning-
ful, Congress included a direct action clause in the Diplomatic Relations
Act.' 47  Section 7 of the Act creates a substantive right on the part of the
injured or damaged victim to proceed directly against the insurer of a dip-
lomatically immune individual. In providing for direct action, the Act
requires a nonjury "bench" trial and prohibits the insurer from raising its
client's diplomatic immunity to avoid liability. It also bars the defense that
the insured is an indispensable party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and prohibits the insurer from invoking breach of contract
to defeat recovery in the absence of fraud or collusion.
Direct action statutes are not novel. The United States Supreme Court,
in Watson v. Employer's Liability Assurance Corp., 4 upheld the constitu-
tionality of a Louisiana direct action statute which allowed suits to be
brought directly against insurance carriers. Direct action legislation is an
internationally recognized and accepted insurance mechanism. Roughly
one half of the 116 nations polled by the State Department permit claim-
ants to bring an action .directly against insurance carriers. 49 For almost
two decades most European nations have been party to the European Con-
vention on Compulsory Insurance Against Civil Liability in Respect of
Motor Vehicles.' 5 ° The Convention not only makes automobile liability
insurance compulsory for all European drivers, but also requires partici-
pating nations to enact domestic direct action legislation. A proposed ex-
ception to diplomatic immunity, ultimately rejected by the Vienna
Convention, would have permitted local jurisdiction over claims for dam-
age and injury arising from traffic accidents unless the receiving state al-
lowed for direct action against insurers. At least one commentator has
146. Gorman v. St. Paul Fire Ins. Co., 210 Md. 1, 121 A.2d 812, (1956) (no direct action
permitted against insurer in advance of judgment).
147. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1364 (West Supp. 1979).
148. 348 U.S. 66 (1954) (Louisiana's direct action statute did not violate either the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment or the full faith and credit clause by compelling
a foreign insurance company to submit to direct action in a products liability case even
though the out-of-state policy prohibited such direct actions, due to the insured manufac-
turer's (Gilette Co.) activities within the state and Louisiana's legitimate interest in safe-
guarding the rights of individuals injured within the state).
149. Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 103-111. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note
85, at 6-7, 1944-45, for a list of nations permitting direct action against the insurance carrier.
150. 720 U.N.T.S. 119.
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suggested that had the Convention convened several years later, the propo-
sal would have gained wider acceptance.'51
Despite its acceptance in international practice, the American insurance
industry understandably reacted with greater hostility to the direct action
provision than it did toward compulsory insurance. The fear of greater
money damage awards from a "target defendant" is not unfounded. It was
argued that the inability to assert policy defenses not only would be grossly
discriminatory against insurers, but would result in closing voluntary mar-
kets to diplomats and in making them pay higher premiums by forcing
them into assigned risk pools and other residual market mechanisms.'
5 2
Furthermore, only several states have enacted legislation allowing for di-
rect right of action against insurers.' 53 The lack of experience by many
insurers in this area, the burdens perceived in defending direct action suits,
and fear of the precedent such legislation could set, all contributed to the
lobby's concerns.
C The Direct Action Provision in Practice
A discussion of an actual situation which arose under the 1790 law
clearly demonstrates the changes wrought in the automobile accident area
by the enactment of the Diplomatic Relations Act. In November 1974, the
automobile Mrs. Robin Lynn Blumberg 5 4 was driving was struck broad-
side by a car driven by a Mrs. Mendes. Blumberg was severely injured.
The police report did not identify Mendes' employer or her own special
status but did indicate that the car was insured by the Government Em-
ployees Insurance Company (GEICO). Blumberg sued Mendes after GE-
ICO rejected Blumberg's claim for damages. Mendes filed a counterclaim
alleging $240,000 in damages. '55 Pretrial proceedings continued for a year
and depositions were scheduled for a month before trial. When it became
apparent that her case was weak, Mendes revealed that she worked as a
secretary for the Brazilian Embassy, dropped her counterclaim, and, with
the aid of GEICO counsel, asserted diplomatic immunity and moved for
151. DENZA, supra note 9, at 151-52. Unlike the limited exceptions to diplomatic staff
immunity in Article 31, driving is often a necessary part of the diplomatic function and the
Convention was undoubtedly reluctant to expand the exceptions to so great an extent. Id at
152.
152. Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 49.
153. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1978); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 26, §§
2001, 2003 (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 632.24 (Supp. 1978). See also R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 27-7-2 (Supp. 1976).
154. Lynn v. Mendes, No. 17712 (Arl. Cir. Ct. April 14, 1976), appeal dismissed 217 Va.
cxii (1977). See Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 32 for a discussion of the case.
155. See note 62 and accompanying text supra.
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dismissal.'56 The insurer argued that only the Supreme Court of the
United States had jurisdiction to hear the case.' 57 It further noted that the
1790 law nullified any personal suit against a diplomatically immune indi-
vidual. Finally, GEICO argued that Blumberg was criminally liable under
the 1790 Act for maintaining suit against a diplomatically immune indi-
vidual. The court dismissed the suit despite Mendes' voluntary submission
to jurisdiction by filing her counterclaim. Due to Mendes' diplomatic im-
munity, Blumberg received no compensation from her own insurer under
Virginia's uninsured motorist statute. As a result, Mendes successfully
used her immunity as both a sword and shield. She refrained from re-
vealing her immunity as long as there was a chance of recovering from
Blumberg. Once it became likely that she would be held liable for negli-
gence, Mendes asserted diplomatic immunity to defeat the claim, aided by
an insurer which had been collecting premiums from her all along.
The 1978 law would substantially alter the outcome of this case. As an
embassy secretary, Mendes would be classified as a member of the admin-
istrative and technical staff within the meaning of Article 1(f) of the Vi-
enna Convention.' 58 Under Article 37(2), Mendes would enjoy immunity
from civil and administrative jurisdiction only for acts performed within
the course of her duties, thereby conditioning personal liability on the
agency status that existed at the time of the collision. 1 9
Several areas of statutory interpretation, however, must be resolved
before the statute can be applied with any degree of certainty. Application
of the direct action provision becomes questionable when the served indi-
vidual is a member of the administrative and technical staff or the service
staff and enjoys only functional immunity. Direct action is to be used
"against an insurer who by contract has insured an individual, who is a
member of a mission (as defined in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations) or a member of the family of such a member of the mis-
sion. .. '"'0 The statute is silent with regard to the provision's applica-
156. Senate Hearings, supra note 38, at 42 (testimony of Stacy Williams, Assistant Vice
President of GEICO). Mr. Williams testified that the insurance company would have been
"absolutely foolish" to waive diplomatic immunity status since insurers are not in the busi-
ness of paying moral obligations. Id at 43.
157. Prior to the enactment of the Diplomatic Relations Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)
(1976) vested the United States Supreme Court with original jurisdiction in diplomatic im-
munity cases.
158. Section 9 of the 1978 Act provided a 90-day effective date for the legislation in order
to give the State Department an opportunity to reclassify the members of the diplomatic
community in accordance with the Vienna Convention categories. SENATE REPORT, supra
note 85, at 8.
159. See note 104 and accompanying text supra.
160. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1364 (West Supp. 1979).
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bility when the accident occurs while the administrative, technical, or
domestic staff member is acting in a private capacity. A determination of
the scope of the direct action provision in this area has yet to be resolved.
Various canons of statutory construction suggest conflicting results.' 6 '
Arguably, the provision is in derogation of the common law providing for
personal suit and therefore should be strictly construed. Conversely, the
policy behind the provision is to provide a remedy to compensate vic-
tims. '62 The remedial character of the provision arguably justifies a liberal
and expansive interpretation. A broad construction permitting direct ac-
tion when the individual is in any event amenable to personal suit, how-
ever, may have the mischievous consequence of extending to the
individual greater protections than those afforded in Article 37 of the Vi-
enna Convention. In contrast to the diplomatic staff, lower level embassy
employees are subject to fewer professional and political restraints and
have traditionally abused their privileges more often by committing of-
fenses or neglecting their obligations.' 63 While an expansive interpretation
of the direct action provision would allow for a simple compensation
mechanism, it would substantially mitigate any deterrent effect personal
suit against a lower level embassy employee might create as well as limit
recovery to insurance proceeds.
If the direct action provision is employed regardless of whether the mis-
sion member has only functional immunity, several issues must be re-
solved: the rights of the insurer in those cases where the lower level
mission is found to be acting in a private capacity; the right of plaintiff to
join the individual as a party defendant; the effect of a dismissal of the
direct action; and the effect of collateral estoppel with regard to final judg-
ment.
Since diplomatic immunity would render compulsory insurance mean-
ingless in the absence of a direct action provision, it is reasonable to as-
sume that absent the immunity, a direct right of action against the insurer
is unnecessary. A strict construction would limit a federal district court's
jurisdiction over direct actions against insurers to those situations in which
the court determines that the individual is in fact immune from personal
suit. The insurer could allege that the functionally immune individual,
acting in a private capacity, may be personally liable and move for dismis-
sal of the direct action. A determination of the individual's agency status
161. See H. READ, J. MACDONALD, J. FORDHAM, W. PIERCE, MATERIALS ON LEGISLA-
TION 904-07 (3rd ed. 1973).
162. H.R. REP. No. 1410, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1978).
163. DENZA, supra note 9, at 226.
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at the time of the accident would be a necessary prerequisite for dismissal.
A substantial degree of judicial deference regarding the individual's claim
of functional immunity may evolve as a result of the traditional respect
accorded diplomatic immunity.
Dismissal of the direct action on jurisdictional grounds would not pre-
clude personal suit in federal court. Section 1351 of Title 28 vests exclu-
sive jurisdiction in federal district courts over all "civil actions and
proceedings against . . . members of a mission or members of their fami-
lies (as such terms are defined in section 2 of the Diplomatic Relations
Act)." 64 Since the defendant who enjoys only functional immunity status
may in fact be personally liable if the negligent conduct occurred while he
was acting in a private capacity, plaintiff should be permitted to join both
the insured and the insurer as defendants.' 65 If the direct action against
the insurer was dismissed, the defendant would be obligated to defend the
action personally. Many insurance policies, however, require the insur-
ance company to defend any suits arising out of the negligent operation of
the insured's automobile. Since the insurer would have the duty to defend
regardless of the agency status of the insured at the time of the accident,
the problems posed by the direct action provision are substantially less-
ened.
There are other compelling reasons for permitting joinder of parties.
Since the embassy employee may have acted in a private capacity when
the negligence occurred, plaintiff should be permitted to seek recovery be-
yond policy limits. If the plaintiff does so, an additional question is raised.
Should the court in the direct action case ultimately conclude that despite
the defendant's private status direct action must be employed, the collat-
eral effect of the judgment against the insurer in a subsequent proceeding
against the tortfeasor must be considered.' 66 The theory of collateral es-
toppel is based on the assumption that some question of law or fact in
164. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1351(2) (West Supp. 1979). Section 1351(1) vests original jurisdiction
for civil actions or proceedings against consuls or vice consuls of foreign states in the federal
district courts. In contrast to the history of blanket immunities with regard to diplomatic
agents, consular officers enjoy only functional immunity. See WHITEMAN, supra note 28, at
§ 12.
165. While many states have enacted statutes permitting joinder in an action in which
both the tort liability of the insured and the contract obligations of the insurer are alleged,
common law barriers may otherwise bar joinder since there are no allegations that the in-
surer participated in the tort or was in privity with the plaintiff. See 8 BLASHMELD, supra
note 131, at § 344.26; R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW 534-35 (1978). Those states which have
enacted direct action statutes expressly provide for joinder of parties. See note 153 supra.
In contrast, 28 U.S.C.A. §1364 (West Supp. 1979), does not address this issue.
166. "Collateral estoppel, like the related doctrine of resyudicata, has the dual purpose of
protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the same party or
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dispute has been actively raised, litigated, and finally decided by a court of
competent jurisdiction between identical parties or their privies. 6 7 Be-
cause of conflicting interests, it is doubtful whether the nonjoined party is
in privity with the insurer in direct action cases. In the New York
"Seider"' 6 8 decisions construing judicially created direct action proceed-
ings, the New York courts have stated that since personal jurisdiction was
only present over the insurer and the policy, a judgment against the insurer
would not foreclose the absent tortfeasor from relitigating the issue of lia-
bility in a subsequent action brought against him.169 Since the insurer in
diplomatic immunity direct action cases cannot raise defenses other than
fraud, collusion, or the expiration of the contract in order to avoid liability,
the rationale against extending the effect of judgment when the insured is
not a party to the claim is self-evident. Since the insured may have acted
in a private capacity and may be liable for amounts over and above policy
limits, his interests and the insurer's interests are neither identical nor co-
extensive. He therefore cannot be in privity with the insurer and should
not be bound by a judgment against the insurer unless he was actively and
personally involved with the defense. Refusal to permit joinder would put
plaintiff to the expense of relitigating the entire issue of liability and could
result in inconsistent verdicts. Moreover, plaintiff could be foreclosed
from subsequently bringing suit if the applicable statute of limitations ex-
pired before personal suit was commenced.
Recovery is not assured even if judgment is rendered against a lower
level staff member for amounts beyond policy limits. He may be destitute
his privy and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation." Parklane
Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645, 649 (1979).
167. See Hansbery v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (state court decree estopping plaintiffs in
second suit under resjudicata from relitigating issue of restrictive agreement previously de-
cided, violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment since they were not
made parties in the original suit, were not adequately represented, and lacked identity of
interest with original plaintiffs). See also Biegelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S.
I 11 (1912); Litchfield v. Goodnow, 123 U.S. 549 (1887).
168. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966) (injured
New York plaintiff filed his tort action in a state where he could not obtain personal jurisdic-
tion over the insured by attaching the insurer's obligation to defend as a debt). Seider quasi
in rem jurisdiction has recently been held not to violate due process despite the absence of
contacts between the insured and New York. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 579 F.2d
194, 202 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 638 (1979).
169. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 111-12 (2d. Cir. 1968), aJ'd on rehearing en
banc, 410 F.2d 117 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969); O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving
Corp., 579 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 638 (1979). The effects of collateral
estoppel in Seider cases are opposite to the direct action provision under consideration since
in both cases it is solely the insurer who is conducting the defense. Issue preclusion may be,
in the absence of personal jurisdiction over the tortfeasor, inconsistent with the requirements
of due process.
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and therefore judgment proof. In any event, Article 32(4) of the Vienna
Convention requires a separate waiver of immunity in respect to execution
of judgment. The scope of this Article has yet to be resolved. 171 If a court
determined that the defendant's conduct was not immunized since he was
acting in a private capacity under Article 37, and a waiver was still re-
quired, the judgment would be rendered meaningless. The sending state
could theoretically refuse to allow execution of judgment against the de-
fendant and foreclose plaintiff's recovery. Conversely, Article 32 may be
construed to require waiver of immunity only in those situations where,
but for the waiver, the individual involved and the conduct alleged con-
tinue to be fully protected by the immunity shield of the Vienna Conven-
tion. 7 ' By removing the issue of waiver of immunity from political
considerations through a narrow interpretation of Article 32, nations party
to the Vienna Convention would more successfully restrain mission mem-
bers from engaging in unprotected conduct. Recovery is also not guaran-
teed since plaintiff may have to seek execution of judgment abroad. The
defendant may only have assets in the sending state. The foreign court
may refuse to give binding effect to a judgment rendered abroad and so
force plaintiff to relitigate the issues in controversy in a less sympathetic
forum. 1
72
D. Retroactive and Prospective Applications of the 1978 Act
Whether the Diplomatic Relations Act is applicable to suits brought af-
ter the date on which the statute came into force but concerning acts com-
mitted before that date is still an open question. Section 9 of the law
provided a ninety day effective period for the legislation in order to give
the State Department time to notify the missions, reclassify the diplomatic
community in accordance with the Vienna Convention provisions, and
170. While Article 32 appears to require waivers of immunity with respect to jurisdiction
and execution of judgment unless a diplomatic staff member or lower level embassy em-
ployee is the one bringing suit, Articles 31 and 37 appear to provide for jurisdiction without
regard to Article 32 waiver. See Articles 31, 32, 37, supra note 3, at 3240-41, 3244.
17 1. An illustration of Article 32 under this restricted interpretation was the recent dis-
covery that the 15 year old son of a diplomat serving the Gambian Embassy was responsible
for setting two school fires which resulted in thousands of dollars worth of damage. As a
family member of a diplomatic agent, the boy enjoyed blanket immunity from jurisdiction.
Arrest and prosecution could have only been accomplished through Article 32 waiver. See
Wash. Post, May 4, 1979, § A, at 1, col. 4.
172. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895) (French judgment in personam
against American citizens held to be primafacie evidence of the justice of the claim and was
not conclusive of the merits of the controversy). For a discussion of all the suits involved in
Hilton v. Guyot, see von Mehren, and Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications; A
Survey and Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1601 (1968).
[Vol. 28:797
Diplomatic Relations Act
promulgate necessary regulations. The law is silent with regard to its ret-
roactive application.
The retroactivity of the Vienna Convention was considered by an Eng-
lish Court of Appeals in Empsom v. Smith. 7 ' An individual brought an
action for a breach of a lease in an English county court against a diplo-
matically immune Canadian official in 1963. The officer was a member of
the administrative and technical staff. The case was still pending when
Parliament repealed the Statute of Anne and enacted the Diplomatic Privi-
leges Act of 1964 which, like the 1978 American law, incorporated the Vi-
enna Convention. Though originally subject to dismissal on immunity
grounds, the Empsom court held that the new Act was applicable to suits
brought after its enactment for actions arising prior thereto.
1 74
Analogizing to the 1978 Act, of like remedial nature, any suit or pro-
ceeding pending at the time the 1790 Statute was repealed should enjoy
retroactive application of the new legislation to the extent it incorporates
the Vienna Convention provisions. Because the direct action provision of
the Diplomatic Relations Act creates a substantive and new right of recov-
ery, however, it should be applied prospectively. The House Committee
report expressly stated that the direct action provision should apply only to
insurance contracts entered into or renewed after the bill's enactment.
75
IV. DISTRICT PARKING AND TRAFFIC ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE
1978 ACT
The blanket immunities from criminal and civil jurisdiction accorded
the diplomatic community under the 1790 Statute resulted in that commu-
nity's total nonaccountability for infractions of local parking and traffic
laws since violations were entirely within the District's criminal jurisdic-
tion.176 Congressional enactment of the Vienna Convention was itself in-
sufficient to effectively address this problem since, under Article 37, the
diplomatic staff, the administrative and technical staff, and their families
had blanket immunity from criminal prosecution.
To remedy this situation, the District of Columbia enacted the Traffic
Adjudication Act of 1978. 7 The Act decriminalizes and provides for ad-
ministrative adjudication of parking and minor traffic violations. The Dis-
trict of Columbia Council enacted the Act partially in anticipation of a
revision of the immunity laws. Only members of the diplomatic staff and
173. 1 Eng. Rep. 426 (Q.B. 1966).
174. Id at 437-38.
175. H.R. REP. No. 1410, supra note 162, at 5.
176. See notes 86-88 and accompanying text supra.
177. D.C.L. No. 2-104 (1978).
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their families enjoy blanket immunity from administrative jurisdiction
under the Diplomatic Relations Act. Because administrative adjudication
shifts the focus from traditional punishment of traffic violations to rein-
forcing policies designed to relieve traffic congestion and encourage mass
transit use, the Act is much more comprehensive in scope. 17 8 Administra-
tive adjudication thus serves as a procedural tool by which the District can
assert jurisdiction over traffic violators within the diplomatic community
who have either no immunity or only functional immunity under the new
law.
Extensive towing and booting have been employed by the District to
implement this new administrative procedure. According to the D.C.
Transportation Department, any automobile bearing diplomatic license
plates (DPL) is subject to towing if it blocks traffic or causes a safety haz-
ard even though the driver may be a diplomatic staff member who enjoys
total immunity from administrative jurisdiction.'79 Administrative and
technical staff personnel as well as members of the service staff are liable
for payment of fines unless they can show by "sufficient evidence" that the
fines were incurred while they were performing an authorized or official
act. Hearing examiners will accept only individualized letters from high
ranking staff members before granting official acts immunity.
80
These procedures pose several immediate problems. For example, is a
statement from the mission that the charged individual was engaged at the
time in an official function sufficient to meet the District Act's needs? To
what extent, if any, can the hearing officer demand specific facts to support
the defense that the individual was engaged in an official function? Is it
within the hearing examiner's authority to reject the defense even while
the mission insists that immunity bars administrative jurisdiction? Clearly,
a large degree of deference must be accorded the mission if such disputes
are to be avoided.
State Department officials fear possible reprisals by foreign governments
in response to the new D.C. law and its enforcement procedures.' 8' As
noted earlier in this comment, the concept of reciprocity underlies the
practice of diplomatic relations. Fears of reprisals from capitals which do
not now enforce traffic violations thus are not totally unfounded. Never-
178. Telephone conversation with Mr. Robert O.D. Thompson, Assistant Director of
Motor Vehicles, Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 8, 1979).
179. Id
180. Wash. Post, Jan. 13, 1979, § C, at 1, col. 3. Form letters will not be accepted and





theless, because traffic violations are usually unrelated to diplomatic activi-
ties, strict enforcement of the District law should not be diluted in an
attempt to foster better diplomatic relations.
V. CONCLUSION
Repeal of the 1790 diplomatic immunity statute and the enactment of
the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 represents an extraordinary two hun-
dred year leap in United States law on diplomatic practice. The issue of
tortious automobile conduct is, aside from questionable regulations gov-
erning policy limits, almost completely resolved in the compulsory insur-
ance and direct action provisions of the statute. The impact of the Vienna
Convention categories and exceptions to privileges and immunities in the
areas of criminal, contract, tort, and property law is potentially no less
sweeping.
The extent of the Act's impact, however, will ultimately be determined
by an almost matrix-like consideration of parties and claims. As the status
of mission members or the implications of the particular controversy de-
scend in importance, courts may actively assert jurisdiction by restrictively
interpreting functional immunity. Conversely, a court must accord much
greater deference to the defenses of an ambassador who is being sued since
the threat of disrupting mission functions may have international repercus-
sions. Even though the 1978 law provides for jurisdiction over many
members of the diplomatic corps, the successful assertion of jurisdiction
will often depend on judicial reflection over the immutable core of diplo-
matic privileges and immunities-reciprocity.
Barry Cohen
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